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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RONALD BRADSHAW,
Plaintifj-Respondent,
vs.
WALTER W. KERSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent,
and
Case No.
HELEN G. KERSHAW,
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Defendant-Respondent,
and
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
WALTER W. KERSHAW and HELEN G. KERSHAW
NATURE OF THE CASE
By cross-claim defendant-appellant, Rockefeller Land
& Livestock Company, claims damages against defendants
and respondents, Walter W. Kershaw and his wife, Helen
G. Kershaw, for a claimed breach of warranty on transfer
by quit claim deed to real property.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The brief of defendant-appellant, Walter W. Kershaw,
heretofore filed herein contains what we submit as a fair
statement of the proceedings in the lower court. Without
unnecessary repetition, we will elaborate more fully upon
the cross-claim of Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Rockefeller".
The two Rogers, Willard B. and Edward B., who own
and control the company, joined in an answer to plaintiff Bradshaw's second amended complaint (R. 62-63). By
a separate pleading served on December 5, 1971, Rockefeller filed an answer and counterclaim to plaintiff Bradshaw's second amended complaint asserting a prior claim
to the 480 acres, a portion of the subject real property
(R. 65-66). Helen G. Kershaw was first named as a party
defendant by the cross-claim served on March 27, 1972
(R. 68-69). The cross-claim demands $50,000.00 plus costs
against the Kershaws, but in the body of the instrument
the claim is conditioned upon Rockefeller not recovering
the property described in Exhibit P-4. The company makes
the allegation of an unqualified warranty subject only
"to an interest of Grant D. Staples and Grace W. Staples,
his wife."
The Kershaws moved for a dismissal at the close of
plaintiff's case and rested their side of the controversy
should the motion to dismiss be denied. The witness
Wankier, county supervisor of the Farmer's Home Administration, was called out of turn by Mr. Kershaw but
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this does not, in our view, alter the overall concept of
the case presenting legal, as distinguished from factual,
issues. We have heretofore failed to mention that Mr.
Kershaw's counterclaim against plaintiff was dismissed
on motion without prejudice early in the proceedings
(Rep. Tr. 8).
The Rogers and Rockefeller were content to rest
their case after calling as their only witness Mr. Kershaw,
who testified as an "adverse witness" thus permitting
cross-examination by the Rogers on the one hand and the
plaintiff Bradshaw on the other hand. The Rogers were
content to rest their case upon the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Kershaw (Rep. Tr. 562). There was no
proof of damage offered by the Rogers or their company.
Before the jury was discharged, the trial court had
requested and had received proposed instructions from
both Bradshaw and the Rogers. The Rogers by their
request No. 15 (R. 190), their request No. 16 (R. 191),
and their request No. 19 (R. 194), asserted, in effect,
that there was no factual issue to be resolved by the
jury. We believe the record supports that concept. The
construction of written documents and uncontradicted
testimony with reference to the real and substantial factual issues remained the real thrust of Bradshaw's affirmative action and the cross-claim of Rockefeller. Any
claimed error in discharging the jury was harmless and
of no significance under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Kershaws, husband and wife, defendants and
respondents, seek to have this court affirm the dismissal
of the cross-claim against them as asserted by appellant
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

u

Mr. Kershaw had an understanding with Milton
Christensen that he, Christensen, would have until noon
on November 15, 1970, to refinance his contract on the
Kimball Ranch. Failing in this respect, Mr. Kershaw
committed all of his holdings in Millard County, including the Kimball Ranch, to the Rogers. The transaction
was consummated on December 17, 1970, the date of the
assignment, Rogers Exhibit D-7, which was recorded on
December 22, 1970. The assignment included the 480
acres described as Parcel No. 1 in the option agreement,
P-4. On the same day, December 17, 1970, and recorded
December 22, 1970, Walter W. Kershaw and Helen G.
Kershaw, husband and wife, quit claimed all property
interests to Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company (Rogers Exhibit D-9). The exhibits were prepared by the
Rogers in their office at Salt Lake City. The office is
that of Utah Title and Abstract Company managed and
operated by Edward B. Rogers (Rep. Tr. 561). The fact
that the Rogers knew of the Staples Escrow is documented in the Rogers Exhibit D-7.
The Rogers were present in the office of attorney
Bayles when Mr. Kershaw repudiated the option. The
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Rogers were at all times advised by Mr. Kershaw that
he was assigning to them no more or no less than he had
contracted to receive from Marion Kesler, the 480 acres,
and from Mrs. Staples, the 80 acres. Independent of those
items, Mr. Kershaw transferred to the Rogers his equity
in the Kimball property and certain personal items.
The Rogers acknowledge that Christensen offered
to sell them the option, P-4, for $2,500.00. The Rogers
were obviously of the same opinion as was Mr. Kershaw
that the option had no vitality otherwise ordinary prudence would have dictated the advisability of taking
Christensen out of the picture if only to mitigate possible
damage and avoid further conflict. The record discloses
that the Rogers were people of means and knew of the
option (Rep. Tr. 555). The company had large holdings
in Millard County. There was a calculated risk on the
part of the Rogers; people sophisticated in land title, in
ranching, and in business ventures. Mr. Kershaw, by his
own admission, was not on a par with either plaintiff
Bradshaw, the Rogers, or their company (Rep. Tr. 527).
The testimony of Mr. Kershaw called as a witness
by the Rogers and with respect to which there was no
contradictory or rebuttal evidence, was to the effect that
if the Rogers were not entirely satisfied and if they felt
that there had not been a complete and full disclosure
of all of the facts, they could rescind the transaction and
receive back the check for $5,000.00 which would not be
deposited by Mr. Kershaw until December 31,1970 (Rep.
Tr. 549, 552-555). Mr. Kershaw reported a calculated
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tax loss in 1970 of some $26,000.00 (Rep. Tr. 553). In
dealing with the Rogers he disclaimed any interest in any
property, real or personal, in the Staples Escrow except
the 480 acres for which he had negotiated with Marion
Kesler and which could not be isolated from the escrow
until the entire Staples agreement had been paid out
(Rep. Tr. 558). The Rogers were immediately advised
of Christensen's claim under the option (Rep. Tr. 549).
The quit claim deed speaks for itself as does the
assignment. The latter instrument, Rogers Exhibit D-7,
expressly limits any warranty or covenant relating to
title to the buyers (Kesler) interest in the so-called
Staples Escrow. Title to the 480 acres could not be obtained until the payout of the Staples Escrow.
The brief of appellants Rogers combines their contentions with respect to Bradshaw and the contentions
of the company as to Mr. and Mrs. Kershaw. Mrs. Kershaw is appearing for the first time on the cross-claim
and appellant Walter W. Kershaw is now in the role of
a respondent against the same cross-claim being urged
against his wife. The peculiarities of the situation require
in addition to direct response, some oblique statements
with reference to Bradshaw, all as will hereinafter be
pointed out.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO DISCHARGE THE
JURY.
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Extensive argument of counsel for the discharge of
the jury, particularly in light of the fact that the counterclaim of appellant Kershaw against Bradshaw had been
dismissed, is contained in the Reporter's Transcript, Pages
374-379. At the time respondent rested his case, the Kershaws made a motion to dismiss (Rep. Tr. 489). There
was again extensive comment by the trial court and all
counsel and the Rogers, by their counsel, joined in the
motion to dismiss Mrs. Kershaw from the action (Rep.
Tr. 490-492). At that point in time, the Rogers, by their
counsel, affirmatively moved the court to direct the jury
to return a verdict of no cause of action with reference
to the plaintiff's claims (Rep. Tr. 492-495).
At that point appellant Walter W. Kershaw announced to the court that if his motion to dismiss was
not granted, he would rest his case without adducing
further evidence, he taking the position that the action
was one in specific performance and that plaintiff had
failed to make out a sufficient case for the court or the
jury. It was at this juncture that the court granted the
motion to dismiss the jury (Rep. Tr. 495-497).
The comments of counsel concurring in the motion
to dismiss and affirmatively moving for a directed verdict
coupled with the requested instructions Nos. 15, 16, and
19 and that the cross-claim be dismissed as against the
alleged co-obligor, Helen G. Kershaw, was sufficient, we
believe, to entitle the trial court to exercise a discretionary prerogative with respect to dismissing the jury. The
propriety of the trial court's action in that regard rings
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loud and clear in the context of the cross-claimant's case
being concluded at the close of the examination of appellant Walter W. Kershaw, called as an adverse witness.
There was no evidence of money damage. There was
nothing left by way of a factual matter for a jury to determine.
Point III of the brief of appellant Rockefeller asserts
erroneous factual issues claimed to have been within the
prerogative of a jury. The contention that $100.00 was
never paid as recited in the option, Exhibit P-4, that
appellant Kershaw signed the option in blank, that the
option was revoked, and that understandings between
appellant Kershaw and the optionee Christensen were
all before the court without contrary or rebutting testimony of any consequence which would justify determination by a jury.
The evidence is without contradiction to the effect
that Christensen did present the option to the Farmer's
Home Administration Agency and that as Mr. Kershaw's
agent, Christensen was authorized to complete the document as he saw fit to accomplish the mutual purpose of
rehabilitating and refinancing his position with respect
to the Kimball Ranch. All of these matters were known
to Bradshaw as well as the continuing effect of the Staples
Escrow. Christensen's testimony, called as a witness by
Bradshaw, was binding upon the latter and he, Bradshaw,
knew that the 480 acres could not be the matter of title
negotiation until there was a payout under the escrow
agreement. Furthermore, Bradshaw testified that his in-
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terest was limited to the 480 acres and that he could not
see his way clear to buy the other property including the
Kimball Ranch (Rep. Tr. 367).
Point IV of the Rogers brief comments on claimed
factual matters in relation to "tender of acceptance". The
same factual misconception is contained within Point I
of their brief. The tender of performance is erroneously
equated with the letter from attorney Bayles. The philosophy of Holland vs. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d
989 (1960), was before the trial court without any factual
dispute and for what effect it might have in weighing the
equitable principles of specific performance, a burden imposed upon respondent and which we contend he did not
meeX/.
POINT II.
THE ROGERS POINT IV.
We subscribe to the degree of certainty and the
various other elements that must be determined on the
equity side of the court in an action for specific performance and that the trial court erred in requiring a warranty
deed from appellant Kershaw to Bradshaw. On this issue
the Rogers, however, confuse Helen G. Kershaw with Dorothy W. Kershaw. Dorothy is a stranger to the record
and to these proceedings. Helen, at the time of the transaction with the Rogers and at the time of trial, was and
still is the wife of Walter W. Kershaw.
The trial court found that there was no proof of the
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marital status of Walter W. Kershaw at the time of the
option agreement and that there was no privity of contract, express or implied, between Helen and Bradshaw
(R. 224). The trial court, however, in its finding No. 8
(R. 225) was in error in describing the tender made by
Bradshaw on January 8, 1971, as identifying Dorothy as
being at that time the wife of Walter W. Kershaw.
The finding recites that Bradshaw offered to pay the
balance of the money held by Security Title Company
as escrow agent to Walter W. Kershaw upon receipt of
"a warranty deed executed by Defendant, Walter W.
Kershaw and his wife'9. The deed and escrow instructions
required the signature of Dorothy W. Kershaw and it is
a matter of record that on December 22, 1970, it was
Helen G. Kershaw and not Dorothy who was the wife of
Walter. There was no evidence of any change in the
marital status from December 22, 1970, to January 8,
1971. The requirement in the escrow instructions that
Dorothy Kershaw sign the deed as the wife of Walter
was a requirement prerequisite to the payment of money,
a condition out of the blue and clearly beyond any contractual commitment.
The Rogers confuse the letter from attorney Bayles
on December 1 as being a tender of performance. This
letter merely confirms the contention that Christensen
claimed the option to be a viable instrument as of that
date. Christensen, in testifying for the plaintiff, repudiated his understanding with appellant Kershaw to the
effect that all of the latter's real property interests in
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Millard County were to be refinanced through the F. H. A.
to the mutual advantage of both Christensen and Kershaw. Christensen by his activities in December, both
with respect to the Rogers in considering selling the
option to them for $2,500.00 and his dealings with Bradshaw in selling the option for $5,000.00 with a down-payment of $500.00 and the balance to be paid dependent
upon the outcome of this litigation repudiated his relationship with Kershaw. Christensen testified by way of
justification in dealing with the property as his own,
"Loss of interest in the property due to the fact that I
did not have the Kimball property immediately to the
west of it" (Rep. Tr. 194).
The tender of performance was the document, Exhibit P-9, the Escrow Instructions Letter, attached to
which was the warranty deed to be signed by Walter and
Dorothy Kershaw. Paragraph No. 2 under the title "Instructions" of Exhibit P-9 states that of the money deposited with the escrow holder, the check to be delivered
must be made payable to "Walter W. Kershaw and Grace
W. Staples, individually and as Guardian of the Estate
of Grant D. Staples".
The instructions to the escrow holder as last above
quoted should have been mentioned in our prior brief.
We submit that the condition requiring payment to Grace
W. Staples, individually or in a representative capacity,
is an uncertainty recognized by the respondent, going to
the heart of the uncertainties and ambiguities of the option agreement, Exhibit P-4. It is one man's interpreta-
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tion of the language used with respect to both Parcel Nos.
1 and 2 as described in the option. How about the opinion
of another man that Marion Kesler had an interest in
the proceeds of the check? How about the opinion of
still another individual that it was Kershaw who was
obligated, if at all, to make peace with his predecessors
in interest if a warranty deed was to be exacted. These
uncertainties and inconsistencies should defeat the equitable application of specific performance.
POINT III.

THE ROGERS HAVE NO CLAIM FOR DAMAGE AGAINST THE KERSHAWS.
The claim of $42,500.00 is without any support whatsoever in the record. This alone should be sufficient answer to Point V in the Rogers brief. The record is clear
that the Rogers knew that Christensen was claiming the
option agreement to be a viable instrument, they knew
that Christensen was attempting to deal with it to his
own personal advantage with Bradshaw and even the
Rogers. The Rogers knew of all adverse claims and on
December 31, 1971, before their check was negotiated,
they were given an opportunity to back away from the
transaction.
The Rogers knew of the Staples Escrow and that
the 480 acres could not be severed until there was a payout under the escrow and that all Kershaw was purchasing out of the escrow was the 480 acres. The Rogers
prepared the assignment, Rogers Exhibit D-7, and the
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quit claim deed, Rogers Exhibit D-9. They are sophisticated individuals with respect to title. Their business is
known as Utah Title Abstract Company. On Page 20
of their brief, they quote from the assignment to the effect
that the warranty of the assignor is limited to the interests of the "buyers".
The alleged warranty, for whatever it may be worth,
had to do only with the buyer's interest under the Staples
Escrow agreement. The transaction with Rockefeller
Land & Livestock Company was by quit claim so far as
the property in the option agreement, Exhibit P-4, is concerned. The $5,000.00 covered all interests of appellant
Kershaw in his property holdings in Millard County and
he made no representation of title. There was no proof
and there can be no claim of damage under the circumstances indicated which includes the opportunity to mitigate any possible damage by buying the option from
Christensen for $2,500.00.
CONCLUSION
By comparison of the two briefs, that of appellant
Kershaw and that of appellants Rogers, there is a common interest in a number of respects. As far as respondent Bradshaw is concerned, there is a common interest
in the discharge of the jury, but as to Bradshaw, that is
where the trail ends. It is submitted that the trial court
misinterpreted Exhibit P-4 and failed to recognize that
the Bradshaw tender was nothing more than a counterproposal, and that under all of the undisputed facts and
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circumstances, Bradshaw was not entitled to a warranty
deed by way of specific performance.
Appellant Kershaw is in the middle of two sophisticated and knowledgable land owners, both of whom, in
their own way, are seeking to capitalize upon the conduct
of Mr. Kershaw which, in retrospect was careless and
inept (Rep. Tr. 527). Mr. Kershaw's conduct was that
of an individual who was not overreaching, who was not
deceptive, and who dealt with both Christensen and the
Rogers in the best of faith and after making full and complete disclosures. The only out-of-pocket money for
which there was no value received was $500.00 paid by
Bradshaw to Christensen. Bradshaw knew that Christensen was dealing on his own account, in repudiation of
his relationship of trust and confidence with Mr. Kershaw,
and he, Bradshaw, should not be heard to complain.
All affirmative claims against appellant Walter W.
Kershaw and respondent Helen G. Kershaw by Bradshaw
and by Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company should
be dismissed with costs herein incurred.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN & GUSTIN
By Harley W. Gustin
Paul H. Liapis
Attorneys for Respondents
Walter W. and
Helen G. Kershaw
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